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“UFO”: WHEN THE AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS VISITED
ISRAEL
Mohammed S. Wattad *
As part of the gradual preparation for the incorporation of the American ripeness doctrine into
Israeli law, it has been justified on a number of grounds. A fundamental discussion of the scope
of the doctrine may be found in three important legal cases, which coined the term “the ripeness
doctrine, Israel style.” A review of these cases reveals that while there is widespread consensus
among the Israeli Supreme Court justices regarding the actual adoption of the ripeness doctrine,
there is disagreement – and even confusion – regarding the manner of its implementation. In
this article, I would like to present a principled position that opposes the adoption of the
American ripeness doctrine in Israeli constitutional law. This position rests on four main
arguments: (1) no methodology whatsoever has been employed to incorporate the American
ripeness doctrine into Israeli constitutional law; (2) the objectives underlying the ripeness
doctrine, as presented by the Court, even if worthy and correct in themselves, do not compel the
incorporation of the American doctrine into Israeli law; (3) the adoption of the ripeness doctrine
in Israeli law, including its development in terms of scope and application is ambiguous, replete
with inconsistencies, and creates legal uncertainty; and, (4) it seems that the incorporation of the
ripeness doctrine into Israeli law is motivated by the judiciary’s desire to avoid conflict with the
political authorities, principally the legislature, particularly in light of ongoing political threats to
curtail the Court’s powers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the
ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its basic rationale
is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves
2
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in abstract disagreements over administrative policies,
and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a
twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.1
This is the American ripeness doctrine, which examines whether a
particular constitutional issue is ripe for judicial review prior to a
piece of legislation actually being implemented by the executive
branch. This is the doctrine due to be introduced into Israeli
constitutional law which declares that when a constitutional question
arises, in the absence of a concrete set of facts, the judicial decision
on the substantive issues must be delayed to a later time.2 As part of
the gradual preparation for the incorporation of the ripeness doctrine
into Israeli law, it has been justified on a number of grounds: first, as
a tool for regulating the stream of referrals and other matters
submitted to the Court; second, to meet the need to save judicial time
and increase efficiency; third, to deal with the possibility that, over
time, the necessity to decide certain fundamental issues will be
obviated; and fourth, the desire to increase public confidence in the
judiciary by confining judicial intervention to cases where the dispute
is concrete.3

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–149 (1967).
HCJ 7190/05 Lobel v. Gov’t of Israel, Nevo Legal Database (2006)
(opinion of Naor, J.).
3 Id.; see also HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n v. Minister of Fin., Nevo Legal
Database (2012); HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt. Trs.’Ass’n v. State of Israel,
Nevo Legal Database (2012); AAA 7201/11 Rahmani DA Earthworks v. Airports
Auth., Nevo Legal Database (2014)) (helping to show that the Court favours the
concept that its main function is to resolve disputes and not restrain the
government).
1
2
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A fundamental discussion of the scope of the doctrine may
be found in three important legal cases,4 heard by expanded panels of
judges, which coined the term “the ripeness doctrine, Israel style”.
This term signifies the following process: in the first stage, the Court
examines whether a concrete set of facts is needed to determine the
constitutional question itself; upon a positive answer being attained in
the first stage, the Court will examine, as part of a second stage,
whether other grounds exist which nonetheless require a judicial
decision to be made on the constitutional question.5 A review of the
judgments in these three cases reveals that while there is widespread
consensus among the Israeli Supreme Court justices regarding the
actual adoption of the ripeness doctrine,6 there is disagreement – and
even confusion7 – regarding the manner of its implementation. In
this debate among the justices, three notable trends can be pointed
out: first, emphasizing the need for a cautious approach to the
adoption of the American doctrine as it stands; second, a reversion to
first principles in relation to the Court’s duty to decide disputes
brought before it; and third, the extension of the list of exceptions to
the principle of the applicability of the ripeness doctrine, with an
emphasis on the presence of covert discrimination, the existence of
broad governmental discretion which is missing clear criteria, the
concern that the fundamental issue at hand will not be referred again
to the Court for determination, the existence of a serious
infringement of a constitutional right, and the absence of an
alternative process for more effectively determining the claims.
In the legal literature, one may encounter the view that by
adopting the ripeness doctrine the Court is expressing its reluctance
to clash with the political authorities, among other things, in light of
the ongoing political threats and attempts to erode the Court’s
4 See HCJ 2311/11 Sabah v. Knesset, Nevo Legal Database (2014); HCJ
3166/14 Gutman v. Att’y Gen., Nevo Legal Database (2015); HCJ 5239/11 Avneri
v. Knesset, Nevo Legal Database (2015).
5
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at paras. 17, 21 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
6 See HCJ 5239/11 Avneri, at para. 1.
7
Ariel Bendor, Ripeness and More, 8 MISHPATIM 33, 35 (2016) (“[S]ome of
the judges agreed with the position of other judges . . . but described the position
with which they agreed in a manner different to that in which it was presented by
other judges who espoused it.”).
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powers.8 In substantive terms, a review of the legal literature shows
that there are, almost, no legal expositions fundamentally criticizing
the adoption of the doctrine per se.9 According to Yitzhak Zamir’s
approach – which, in my humble opinion, is erroneously perceived to
express principled opposition to the ripeness doctrine – adoption of
the ripeness doctrine does not offer any benefit given the traditional
threshold criteria (for example, relating to the petition being
‘premature’). On the contrary, in his view, the doctrine creates legal
uncertainty and even makes the legal process more complex.10 I am
not convinced that Yitzhak Zamir is, in principle, opposed to the
ripeness doctrine. I understand his argument to be that this doctrine
does not offer anything novel, but rather forms part of the longstanding threshold criteria, for example, in the case of a premature
petition. It seems to me that this argument can, if anything, support
the ripeness doctrine as forming part of a well-established and wellknown body of law: one that does not change fundamental
principles. In any case, in contrast to Yitzhak Zamir’s approach,
Elena Chachko11 confines her critique to the manner in which the
American doctrine is applied in Israeli law. In her view, the
substantive application of the American doctrine would actually lead
the Court to deliberate and decide upon the merits of the
constitutional questions before it.12 Like Chachko, Ariel Bendor
criticizes the manner in which the ripeness doctrine is applied in
Court rulings, while at the same time pointing out the power of the
Court to expand the scope of judicial review by utilizing the doctrine
to develop a discourse which relates not only to the constitutionality
of the law itself but also to the constitutionality of its
See Adam Shinar, Restoring the Former Glory of the High Court’s Threshold
Criteria – Another Look at the Nakba Case, HATRAKLIN - THOUGHTS ON THE LAW
(June 1, 2012). Cf. YITZHAK ZAMIR, ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY 1896 (Vol. 3,
2014); Daphne Barak-Erez, Putting Man at the Center – On Man’s Place in Law, 39
IYONI MISHPAT 5, 24–25 (2016).
9 See Suzie Navot, The Constitutional Dialogue: Dialogue with Institutional Tools,
12 MISHPATIM 99, 121–124 (2018) (I wrote “almost” because Suzie Navot raised
several contemplations in regard to the compatibility of the American doctrine to
the Israeli legal system.).
10
ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1896–897.
11
Elena Chachko, On Ripeness and Constitutionality, 43 MISHPATIM 419, 419
(2012).
12 Id. at 451.
8
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implementation.13 In this article, I would like to present a principled
position that opposes the adoption of the American ripeness doctrine
in Israeli constitutional law. The critical approach presented here is
based on an analytical-critical examination of the circumstances that
have led Israeli constitutional law to adopt the American doctrine.
This position, which expands on the criticisms already presented by
scholars, rests on four main arguments:
First, no methodology whatsoever has been employed when
incorporating the American ripeness doctrine into Israeli
constitutional law. Notwithstanding that a number of judges have
referred to the need to exercise particular caution with regard to the
manner of adopting the American doctrine as it stands, in fact the
doctrine has been adopted intact. In my view, therefore, there is no
basis to the argument that the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” is
indeed “Israel style.” In addition, although some judges have been
clear about the institutional and normative differences between the
American legal system and the Israeli legal system, at the end of the
day, the Court has never truly examined the ramifications of these
differences for the application of American doctrine in Israeli law.
Moreover, it would seem that it is the constitutional differences
between the two legal systems, referred to by the Court, which
indeed support the view that the ripeness doctrine is foreign to Israeli
law and that its adoption is both contrived and artificial.
Second, the objectives underlying the ripeness doctrine, as
presented by the Court, even if worthy and correct in themselves, do
not compel the incorporation of the American doctrine into Israeli
law. This is because the incorporation of the doctrine has not
resulted in any real saving in judicial time or improved efficiency. On
the contrary, the rulings dealing with the ripeness doctrine are spread
over hundreds of pages, and include long, complex, and even
cumbersome legal opinions. In addition, the Israeli constitutional
tradition contains more than enough traditional threshold criteria that
provide a proper response to classic cases of premature petitions, for
example, where there are adequate alternative remedies or the
petitioner has failed to exhaust prior proceedings. Moreover, the
13

Bendor, supra note 7, at 51.
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‘respect clause’ which, pursuant to Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty that underpins the constitutional revolution,14 requires every
governmental authority to respect the rights under that Basic Law, is
binding on all government authorities, including the legislature.
Further, it is the Court’s duty to hear and decide constitutional
questions relating to alleged infringements of fundamental rights,
including, in particular, infringements ostensibly committed by the
legislature. Additionally, the principle of the separation of powers –
in its substantive sense, as a mechanism for checks and balances and
mutual supervision of governmental authorities – actually demands
that the ripeness doctrine be rejected. While public trust in the
professionalism, fairness, and neutrality of the judiciary is a factor
which may properly be considered, public trust in the sense of
avoiding publicized clashes with the political authorities is a
consideration which is both extraneous and invalid.
Third, the adoption of the ripeness doctrine in Israeli law,
including its development in terms of scope and application, is
ambiguous, replete with inconsistencies, and creates legal uncertainty.
On the one hand, in the absence of a concrete factual foundation, the
Court has rejected constitutional petitions even when these involve
important legal questions. On the other hand, in other cases, even
when a detailed factual foundation has been demonstrated, the Court
has dismissed the petitions in limine, this time on the ground that it is
necessary to demonstrate the existence of a cumulative practice of
infringement of a fundamental right. In addition, one may identify a
gross inconsistency regarding the existence of an alternative
procedure as an exception to the applicability of the ripeness
doctrine. In one case, even though an alternative procedure existed,
the Court nonetheless refrained from applying the ripeness doctrine
out of concern that the fundamental issue would not be referred to it
for consideration again. In another case, even in the absence of such
an alternative proceeding, and despite the anticipated damage from
failing to consider and decide the constitutional issue on the merits,
the Court still clung to the ripeness doctrine, while declaring that it
was concerned with a fait accompli, albeit one which was temporary
14
CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Vill., 49(4)
PD 221, 307–08, 313, 411–12, 458 (1995) (Isr.)

7
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(temporary injury over a sustained period). Moreover, even
substantively, an examination of all the legal cases concerning the
ripeness doctrine clearly demonstrates inconsistencies regarding the
manner of application of the doctrine, including the exceptions
thereto. For example, in one case, the Court restricted itself to an
analysis of the law, attaching no relevance to the psychoanalysis of
the legislature, while in another case, the intent of some of the
legislators was considered to have acute legal significance for the
application of the ripeness doctrine. Finally, the legal uncertainty
enveloping the manner in which the ripeness doctrine is being
developed and implemented increases when judges are required to
apply the common sense test. Such a process could lead two judges,
possessing common sense, and hearing the same case to reach two
opposing legal conclusions concerning the applicability, or at least the
scope and manner of implementation of the doctrine.
Fourth, it seems that the incorporation of the ripeness
doctrine into Israeli law is motivated by the judiciary’s desire to avoid
conflict with the political authorities, including principally the
legislature, particularly in light of ongoing political threats to curtail
the Court’s powers. Emphasizing this is the fact that the cases
applying the ripeness doctrine, as explained in this article, dealt with
issues that are at the core of social, political and ideological rifts in
Israeli society. However, it also seems that while the ripeness doctrine
is presented as a tool for self-restraint applied by the judiciary, it is, in
reality, designed in such a way as to leave the absolute discretion as to
its actual application, scope and manner of implementation to the
Court itself. In many cases, even though the Court chose to dismiss
petitions in limine on the grounds of the ripeness doctrine, its rulings
still contained detailed instructions, directed at the executive branch,
as to how the latter should interpret the statutory provisions under
consideration in such a way as to avoid the violation of fundamental
rights in the future. In my view, the adoption of the ripeness doctrine
in Israeli law expresses a form of judicial diplomacy; it is in the nature
of tactical judicial review that creates an indirect constitutional
dialogue with the legislative authority, through the executive branch.
This judicial diplomacy is possible precisely because of the
parliamentary characteristics of Israeli democracy, where the
members of the executive branch are, for the most part, also
8
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members of the legislature. In my opinion, this trend is extremely
worrying, and may impair both the independence and the equilibrium
of Israel’s judiciary, not least by blurring the institutional boundaries
between the legislature and the executive branch.
Therefore, in the second section, I will review the first four
legal cases in the framework of which the ripeness doctrine took its
initial steps toward Israeli constitutional law. In the third section, I
will present the three main legal cases in which the “ripeness
doctrine, Israel style” was shaped. In the fourth, fifth and sixth
sections, respectively, I will discuss critically: the question of the
methodology of using comparative law as a tool for importing legal
doctrines; the purposes underlying the ripeness doctrine; and the
ambiguity, inconsistency, and legal uncertainty involved in the
adoption and application of the ripeness doctrine in Court rulings.
Finally, in the seventh section, I will discuss the implications of
adopting the ripeness doctrine for the institution of judicial review.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN RIPENESS DOCTRINE IN
ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
At the heart of the ripeness doctrine, as enshrined in Israeli
constitutional law, is the precept that when a constitutional question
arises, and in the absence of a concrete set of facts, the judicial
decision on the substantive question must be deferred to a later date.
The doctrine took its first steps in the context of four legal cases
which essentially developed, shaped, and supported the purposes
underlying the doctrine, namely: first, regulation of the stream of
referrals and other matters submitted to the Court; second, saving
judicial time and increasing efficiency; third, dealing with the
possibility that, over time, the need to decide the fundamental issue at
hand would be obviated; and fourth, enhancing public confidence in
the judiciary by confining judicial intervention to cases involving a
concrete dispute. I shall consider each of these four cases, in the
order in which they were decided.

9
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A. The Disengagement Case
At the beginning of 2006, the High Court of Justice dismissed
in limine a petition against the constitutionality of two provisions
enshrined in the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law.15 These
two provisions essentially impose a criminal penalty (six months
imprisonment) and economic sanctions (denial of compensation) on
Israeli residents of the evacuated communities in the Gaza Strip and
northern Samaria if they reside or return for the purpose of residing
in the evacuated area after the evacuation date set by the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Defense. The ground for the dismissal
of the petition was the threshold criterion concerning the existence
of an effective alternative remedy provided by the Disengagement
Implementation Law. According to the Court, first, it was possible to
examine the constitutionality of the criminal sanction in the context
of the criminal process as such, in the event that one was pursued;
second, it was possible to raise claims against the economic sanction
before the eligibility committees as well as before the special
committees, if and when such a sanction was applied.16 However, in
her separate judgment, Justice Miriam Naor added – notably, in an
individual opinion – an additional ground for dismissing the petition
outright: one rooted in the ripeness doctrine, which was borrowed
entirely from American law.17 According to Justice Naor, the crux of
the ripeness doctrine is that, in the absence of a concrete, clear and
complete set of facts, which are necessary for the purpose of forming
a principled judicial decision, the Court will not consider the petition
itself. This, as a tool to regulate the stream of referrals and other
matters submitted to the Court, is a tool capable of deferring judicial
decisions but not necessarily preventing them.18 In her view, the
HCJ 7190/05 Lobel, at paras. 3–8 (opinion of Naor, J.); see also
Disengagement Plan Implementation Law, 5775 – 2005 (Isr.).
16 See HCJ 7190/05 Lobel, at paras. 11–14 (opinion of Barak, J.) (Decisions
of the eligibility committees may be appealed as of right to the Magistrate’s Court
in Jerusalem, and subsequently appealed as of right to the District Court of
Jerusalem. These committees’ decisions may be appealed as of right to the
Administrative Affairs Court in Jerusalem, and subsequently, also as of right, to the
Supreme Court.).
17 Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Naor, J.); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 334–335 (Foundation, 3rd ed. 2000).
18
HCJ 7190/05 Lobel, at paras. 5, 7.
15
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ripeness doctrine is not intended to replace other threshold criteria,
such as the existence of adequate alternative remedies or failure to
exhaust proceedings, but to supplement them. Thus, petitioning for
an alternative remedy or exhaustion of proceedings may, in fact,
themselves produce the ripeness required for an informed judicial
decision on the constitutional question.19
B. The Nakba Case
About six years after the Disengagement case, Justice Miriam
Naor (with whom Justice Dorit Beinisch and Justice Eliezer Rivlin
concurred) dismissed a petition against the constitutionality of a
provision in the Budget Foundations Law, authorizing the Minister
of Finance to reduce the budget of a budgeted or financially
supported body where, among other things, it is found that the body
has issued a publication that in essence denies the existence of the
State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state or marks the day of
the establishment of the State as a day of mourning.20 According to
the Court, notwithstanding the important and fundamental legal
issues facing the Court,21 it was conceivable that the alleged
infringement of a protected right might not take place at all given the
complex mechanism within which the Minister of Finance was
required to act.22 According to Justice Miriam Naor, it was also
possible that, over time, a fundamental decision on the important
issues raised by the petition would become otiose, either because the
Minister of Finance would decide not to exercise the authority vested
in him, or because he might decide to use that authority in a manner
that did not harm the petitioners.23 In terms of the qualifications to
the application of the ripeness doctrine, Justice Miriam Naor added
that if it was proven that waiting until the petition ripened would
Id. at paras. 7–8.
HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n; see also Budget Foundations Law
(Amendment No. 40), 5771–2011 (Isr.).
21
HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n, at para. 28 (opinion of Naor, J.).
22 Id.
23 Id. at para. 33. I should note that it is not at all clear to me how the
Minister of Finance can exercise his powers in such a manner that marking the day
of the establishment of the state as a day of mourning will not compel him to
exercise his said power, or at least exercise it in such a way as not to harm the
institutions which are the subject of the power.
19
20
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cause immediate severe harm to the petitioner, then in such a case
the Court would not abstain from rendering a judicial decision.24
C. The Securities Case
About a month after the Nakba case, Justice Eliezer Rivlin
(with whom Justice Neal Handel and Justice Uzi Vogelman
concurred) also had cause to consider the ripeness doctrine. This
occurred in the course of a hearing of petitions against the
constitutionality of a provision of the Securities Law, which was
inserted by virtue of the Increased Efficiency of Enforcement
Procedures in the Securities Authority (Legislative Amendments)
Law, 5771-2011, which prohibits, in certain circumstances, issuing
insurance and the existence of indemnification arrangements against
administrative enforcement proceedings.25 Underlying the petition in
this case was the argument that this provision infringed the right to
freedom of occupation as well as the right to equality because the
imposition of severe financial sanctions, in the absence of the
employee’s ability to protect himself against such sanctions by
purchasing insurance, created a chilling effect on the ability to
function in management positions in companies exposed to sanctions
of this type including, in particular, those which did not enjoy
significant economic robustness.26 Relying on the ripeness doctrine,
the Court dismissed the petition in limine on the ground that the full
implementation of the arrangements under appeal had not yet
commenced, and that in any event it was not possible to ascertain the
extent of the harm which might be caused by the said arrangements
where implemented.27 According to Justice Eliezer Rivlin, public
confidence in the judiciary increases when judicial intervention is
carried out in order to prevent the actual violation of fundamental
24 Id. at paras. 30–31 (for example, had the Knesset adopted the original
version of the Day of Independence bill, which contained a criminal sanction of
three years imprisonment, then in view of the harsh criminal sanction it is
conceivable that the Court would have decided the petition on the merits even
before the law was applied in a concrete case); see also United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
25
HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt.; see also Securities Law, 5728-1968 (Isr.).
26
HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt., at para. 5 (opinion of Rivlin, J.).
27 Id. at paras. 11–12.
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rights.28 In his view, protection of public trust in the judiciary is
essential precisely because the judiciary is the weakest authority
relative to the other authorities in the state.29 Thus, according to him,
the Court must preserve its resources, particularly that of public trust,
for the most essential cases in order to “have them available to it on
judgment day – to fulfil the role of protecting fundamental rights.”30
Justice Eliezer Rivlin based this approach on the principle of the
separation of powers, which requires, in his view, confining the
Court’s intervention to cases where the disputes are tangible. In other
words, locus standi is confined solely to those who claim to have
incurred real harm and immediate and personal suffering.31 Finally, it
is noteworthy that Justice Uzi Vogelman, in an individual opinion –
and in light of material differences between American law and Israeli
law, including in relation to the doctrines of locus standi and
justiciability – chose to post his own caution, and leave open the
question of the compatibility of the American ripeness doctrine with
Israeli law.32
D. The Tenders Case
Two years after the decision in the Securities case, Justice Salim
Jubran, in a minority opinion, dismissed in limine an appeal against an
administrative petition concerning the constitutionality of a directive
in the mandatory tender regulations, which deals with the extension
of the grounds permitting, under certain circumstances, the forfeiture
of a tender guarantee.33 According to Justice Salim Jubran, even when
there was a concrete set of facts – such as in the matter at hand –
there were cases – such as in the matter at hand – where it was

Id. at paras. 18–19.
Id.
30 Id. at para. 19.
31 Id. at paras. 13, 17.
32 Id. (opinion of Vogelman, J.).
33
AAA 7201/11 Rahmani, at para. 4 (opinion of Jubran, J.) (helping to
note that Justice Uri Shoham and Justice Yitzhak Amit chose not to refer, at all, to
the position taken by Justice Salim Jubran regarding the application and manner of
implementation of the ripeness doctrine).
28
29
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necessary to demonstrate the existence of a cumulative practice of
infringement of a protected right.34
III. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE, ISRAEL STYLE
While these four cases were primarily concerned with the
development of the purposes underlying the ripeness doctrine, in
three later important legal cases heard by extended panels (nine
justices), the Court focused on shaping the scope of the doctrine,
thereby coining the phrase “the ripeness doctrine, Israel style.” At the
core of the “ripeness doctrine, Israeli-style” is a combined test,
according to which: in the first stage, the Court examines whether a
concrete set of facts is needed in order to decide the constitutional
question on the merits whie, in the second stage, subject to obtaining
a positive answer in the first stage, the Court will examine the
existence of other grounds which nevertheless compel it to render a
judicial decision on the constitutional question. An in-depth
examination of these three cases reveals that, accompanying the
broad consensus among the justices regarding the actual adoption of
the ripeness doctrine, is considerable controversy over its scope.
Three prominent trends can be pointed out in this disagreement
among the justices: one, emphasizing the need for caution regarding
the adoption of the American doctrine as it stands; the second, the
importance of returning to fundamental principles in relation to the
Court’s duty to decide disputes brought before it for adjudication;
and third, extending the exceptions to the applicability of the ripeness
doctrine, through an emphasis on the presence of covert
discrimination, the existence of broad governmental discretion which
lacks clear criteria, the concern that the fundamental issue at hand
will not be referred again to the Court, the existence of a serious
infringement of a constitutional right, and the absence of an
alternative process for more effectively determining the claims. I shall

Id. (helping to argue that the first signs of Justice Salim Jubran’s
approach can be found – albeit not explicitly stated – in the judgment rendered by
Justice Eliezer Rivlin in Israel Capital Mkt.; in dismissing the petition in limine,
Justice Eliezer Rivlin held that the petition did not rely on cases which had actually
occurred, ones that illustrated the assertions made therein).
34
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refer to each of the three cases, in the order in which they were
decided.
A. The Admissions Committees Case
This case concerned a law permitting a communal village to
make the allocation of land to persons applying to reside in the
village contingent upon the prior approval of an admissions
committee, comprised, inter alia, of representatives of that village.
Among the listed statutory grounds on which an admissions
committee may reject a candidate’s application to join and reside in a
communal village, is, inter alia, the candidate’s incompatibility with life
in the community or with the socio-cultural fabric of the community
and village.35 At the same time, the law provides a qualification,
namely, that the admissions committee may not reject candidates
upon grounds of race, religion, gender, nationality, disability, personal
status, age, parenting, sexual orientation, country of origin, outlook or
political-party affiliation.36
Justice Asher Grunis (with whom Justices Miriam Naor,
Elyakim Rubinstein, Esther Hayut, and Hanan Melcer concurred)
dismissed the petitions, stating that at this stage, when the law had
not yet been implemented, the petitions should be dismissed for lack
of a sufficient factual basis upon which to decide the questions at
hand.37 In particular, he reached this conclusion because according to
the law, decisions of the admissions committees could be appealed to
appeals committees, and subsequently to the Administrative Affairs
Court.38 There, in the Administrative Affairs Court, it would be
possible to raise all the relevant constitutional arguments in order to
allow a decision to be reached. In addition, Justice Asher Grunis
emphasized that while he regarded the ripeness doctrine as a
threshold criterion which joined the list of traditional threshold
criteria, it was not necessarily a criterion which was distinguishable in
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah (opinion of Grunis, J.); see also Neta Ziv, Leave Alone the
Admission Committees: (Soon) Twenty Years for Kaadan, 35 MEVZAKI HEAROUT PSIKA 1
(2014).
34
Id.
37
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 10.
38 Id. at para. 23.
34
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principle from the threshold criteria for a premature petition, but
rather a specific instance of such a criterion.39
On the merits, and alert to the need for caution voiced by
Justice Uzi Vogelman in the Securities case,40 Justice Asher Grunis also
emphasized that it was necessary to obtain assistance from the
experience accumulated in the United States in order to develop the
ripeness doctrine;41 however, it was vital to develop the “ripeness
doctrine, Israel style,”42 which at its core was a two-step test:
In the first stage, the Court must decide whether the
central question at issue in the petition is a legal one,
the answer to which does not require a detailed set of
facts, or whether implementation of the law is
required in order to answer it. In the second stage, the
Court is required to consider whether there are
grounds to hear the petition despite the absence of a
sufficient factual basis.43
The first stage did not entail a dichotomous decision as to the
existence or absence of a concrete set of facts. According to Justice
Asher Grunis, it was necessary to examine the scope of the factual
basis required to decide the constitutional questions which were
posed in each and every case. In his opinion, this was the appropriate
way to act in cases where the determination of the legal questions
required a certain set of facts to be present which would assist in
examining whether there had been a violation of a protected right,
and additionally, the nature and intensity of the alleged violation. This
was the case, for example, when one was faced with a statutory
provision permitting “relatively wide leeway for interpretation on the
part of the executive branch when implementing the law.”44 The
39 Id. at para. 11. (in this way, Justice Asher Grunis sought to respond to
Yitzhak Zamir’s criticism regarding the incorporation of the American ripeness
doctrine into Israeli law); see also ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1892–98.
40 See HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt.
41
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 21 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
42 Id.
43 Id. at para. 17.
44 Id. at para. 15.
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latter state of affairs offered a classic case for the application of the
ripeness doctrine; this was because, prior to the implementation of
the law by the executive branch, or prior to its implementation to a
sufficient extent,45 the ramifications of that act could not be
ascertained. Nonetheless, according to Justice Asher Grunis’
approach, when the majority of the question facing the Court was
fundamentally legal, the “future factual development [would] not
contribute to the legal decision”, and hence there was scope to
consider and decide the merits of the constitutional questions in the
absence of, and perhaps notwithstanding the absence of, a concrete
set of facts.46 To illustrate this position, Justice Asher Grunis referred
to legislation which was essentially racist in nature, such as racial
segregation in schools, which was unconstitutional and where no
question arose as to its implementation.47 Another example cited by
Justice Asher Grunis concerned the privatization of prisons, where in
his view the transfer of powers from the state to private entities
operating for profit created an inherent violation of constitutional
rights.48
In the second stage of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style”,
Justice Asher Grunis considered the “chilling effect” – that is, when
leaving the law unchanged could cause people to refrain from
engaging in lawful conduct for fear of having the law enforced
against them – as a case that justified a hearing and determination of
legal questions in the absence, and perhaps despite the absence of, a
concrete set of facts.49 According to Justice Asher Grunis, a chilling
effect could take various forms and occur in various circumstances,
such as: first, where waiting for the implementation of the law would
expose the petitioner to a risk, such as a sanction, or compel him to

45 Id. at para. 12. (showing, to some extent, these remarks adopt the
position taken by Justice Salim Jubran, as set out in a minority opinion in the case
of Rahmani DA Earthworks Ltd., according to which it is not sufficient to point to
a concrete set of facts; there must also be a cumulative practice of harm to the
protected right).
46
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12.
47 Id.; see also Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12; see also HCJ 2605/05 Acad. Ctr. for
Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin., 63(2) PD 545 (2009).
49
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 16 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
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breach the law; second, it could take the form of concern that the
petitioner or the public would suffer damage; third, it might be
concern about the creation of irreversible facts on the ground as a
result of the deferment of a judicial determination on the legal
questions; fourth, because of the nature of the issue in dispute, from
a practical point of view, there potentially might not come a point in
time at which the petition would be considered ripe, and therefore a
hearing of that issue could never be held too soon or too late; and
fifth, where there was a real public interest is determining the
petition, such as where a serious violation of the rule of law had been
committed.50 Countering this, Justice Asher Grunis emphasized that
this second stage of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” examined the
“balance of convenience”51 and that, as a corollary, consideration also
had to be given to situations where “legal inquiry [could] impair the
continuity of administrative action or the ability of the executive
branch to change or amend any policy which it has adopted”.52
This is the place to note that Justice Elyakim Rubinstein and
Justice Naor’s concurrence with the judgment rendered by Justice
Asher Grunis did not reflect their full acquiescence to the “ripeness
doctrine, Israel style”. First, while Justice Elyakim Rubinstein adopted
Justice Asher Grunis’ stance regarding the grounds for dismissal of
the petitions, he did not express a position of principle as to the
“ripeness doctrine, Israel style”. Moreover, he suggested exercising
caution when using the concept of the chilling effect, albeit without
seeking to minimize the value of that idea.53 Despite all this, Justice
Elyakim Rubinstein stated that the issue of the applicability of the
ripeness doctrine was a matter of common sense and emphasized
that this doctrine was not generically different from the threshold
criteria regarding a premature petition.54 Second, Justice Miriam Naor
opined that it was better at this stage to develop the ripeness doctrine

50
51
52
53
54

Id. at para. 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 15 (opinion of Rubinstein, J.).
Id. at para. 14.
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“one step at a time” and that once a “sufficient number of cases were
collected, the Court would be able to formulate an overall picture.”55
In contrast to Justice Asher Grunis, Justice Salim Jubran
ruled in a minority opinion (with which Justices Edna Arbel, Yoram
Danziger, and Neal Handel concurred), that notwithstanding the
absence of a concrete set of facts, including a cumulative practice, the
petition was ripe for a constitutional hearing.56 This was the case, in
his view, due to the existence of covert discrimination, which could
be learned from the background to the enactment of the amendment
to the Cooperative Societies Ordinance;57 the wide discretion, and
absence of clear criteria, granted to the admissions committees;58 and
the concern that the fundamental issue would not be referred again
to the Court in light of the offending party’s practice of retracting the
infringement once judicial proceeding were commenced.59 Underlying
the result reached by Justice Selim Jubran was his approach to the
existence of two considerations that had to guide the Court in
relation to the applicability of the ripeness doctrine: first, the severity
of the injury that might be inflicted on an individual if the petition
was not heard;60 and second, the absence of an alternative procedure
for effectively examining the claims.61
As for Justice Neal Handel, it should be emphasized that his
affiliation with the minority camp, in terms of the outcome of the
judgment, may be misleading.62 For, in relation to the ripeness
Id. at para. 1 (opinion of Naor, J.).
Id. at paras. 9, 65, 84 (opinion of Jubran, J).
57 Id. at para. 9.
58 Id. at para. 32.
59 Id. at para. 10.
60 Id. at para. (opinion of Jubran, J.).
61 Id. at para. 7. In this section, Justice Salim Jubran adopted the view of
Justice Miriam Naor in the Graduates of the Arab Orthodox High School in Haifa,
supra note 3, at para. 31 (opinion of Naor, J.).
62
Justice Neil Handel upheld the petitions, albeit partially, stating that the
petitions were ripe insofar as they pertained to the question of the composition of
the admissions committees. In his view, this composition gave a built-in advantage
to the communal villages as opposed to applicants seeking to join these villages – in
other words, an advantage that created a real danger of unconscious bias and hence
a disproportionate infringement of the right to equality. Id. at para. 16 (opinion of
55
56
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doctrine in general and the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” in
particular, his views seemed to resemble those of Justice Asher
Grunis more closely than those of Justice Salim Jubran. Justice Neal
Handel adopted the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” as proposed by
Justice Asher Grunis,63 yet proposed his own partial ripeness doctrine
under which in those cases where there were constitutional questions,
some of which were ripe and some of which were not, a decision had
to be rendered on those questions which were ripe.64 Underlying
Justice Neal Handel’s position, was the perception that the outcome
of the application of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” did not have
to be “all or nothing.”65 According to Justice Neal Handel, the partial
ripeness doctrine was not intended to replace the “ripeness doctrine,
Israel style” at all; instead, the partial ripeness doctrine formed part of
the second stage of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style:”
When within the framework of the first stage, it is
concluded that the greater part, including the core, of
the petition is not ripe for determination due to the
absence of the concrete infrastructure required in the
circumstances of the matter, though a certain portion
of the petition is ripe for decision now – it will still be
necessary to examine whether grounds exist to split
the various parts of the petition.66

Handel, J.). In this connection, it should be noted that Justice Miriam Naor
explicitly considered Justice Neal Handel’s position, and stated that in relation to
the composition of the admissions committees, Justice Neal Handel’s concerns did
not establish a need for immediate judicial intervention because the decisions of the
admissions committees could be appealed to the appeals committees, which was
comprised of public representatives only – in other words, an objective monitoring
and control mechanism was available. Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Naor, J.).
63 Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Handel, J.).
64 Id. Underlying Justice Neil Handel’s approach were three justifications:
first, it could not be assumed that the complex tests put forward by Justice Grunis
would always lead to a unified result; second, the partial ripeness doctrine had
already been recognized for a long time by American law; and third, the partial
ripeness doctrine stemmed from the objectives of the general ripeness doctrine,
namely efficiency, public confidence in the judiciary, and the enhancement of the
judicial determination. Id. at paras. 4-6.
65 Id. at para. 2.
66 Id. at para. 7.

20

2020

"UFO"

9:1

In his view, at this stage, and within the framework of the
examination of the application of the partial ripeness doctrine, it was
imperative to determine: first, that the proposed splitting of the legal
questions was exceptional (and, as a corollary, a special reason was
required that would justify it; second, that there were considerations
and tests – in addition to those proposed by Justice Asher Grunis
within the context of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style”67 – that
justified recognition of partial ripeness in a particular case. In this
regard, the following had to be considered:68 first, to what extent it
was clear that the specific question under consideration did not
require concrete implementation in order for a constitutional decision
to be made in respect of it;69 secondly, the extent to which the
petition was compatible with the hearing being split, in a manner that
was neither artificial nor would cause the entire legal edifice to
collapse;70 third, whether the question was substantive – both
qualitatively and quantitatively – even if it was not the central or
dominant question in the petition;71and fourth, whether a hearing
now of the issue which was ripe for determination would produce a
benefit that justified the splitting of the petition or obviate future
damage.72
B. The Electoral Threshold Case73
This case was concerned with the constitutionality of raising
the Knesset electoral threshold from 2% to 3.25%. As in the
Admissions Committees case, Justice Selim Jubran, in a minority
Id.
The relationship between the above considerations and tests may be
reciprocal, “in such manner that the clear existence of one consideration may
‘atone’ for the weaker existence of another consideration.” Id. at para. 8.
69
This consideration is similar to that presented by Justice Asher Grunis,
and in respect to which he cited the example of the privatization of prisons. Id. at
para. 12 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
70 Id. at para. 8 (opinion of Handel, J).
71 Id.
72 Id. We are referring to the American “balance of convenience” test to
which Justice Asher Grunis referred in his judgment. Id. at para. 18 (opinion of
Grunis, J.).
73
HCJ 3166/14 Gutman; see also The Knesset Elections Law (Amendment
No. 62), 5774-2014 (Isr.).
67
68
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judgment, faced off against Justice Asher Grunis, albeit this time on
his own.
While Justices Asher Grunis and Salim Jubran both held that
the petitions raised significant questions that touched upon the
fundamental characteristics of the democratic regime in the State of
Israel and the electoral system applied there,74 they were divided
primarily on the question as to whether the time was ripe to discuss
and decide the constitutional issues raised by the petition. Faithful to
the two-step test making up the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style,”
developed by him in the Admissions Committees case,75 Justice Asher
Grunis concluded that the petitions had to be dismissed as being
premature. In contrast, Justice Salim Jubran believed that, both
according to the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” and according to the
criteria he himself had established in the Admissions Committees case in
relation to the severity of the harm which might be caused to the
individual in the event that the petition was not heard, as well as in
relation to the existence or absence of an alternative procedure for
more effectively determining the claims, it would be wrong to dismiss
the petitions on the grounds of the ripeness doctrine.76
It is interesting to note that even though the two judges
supported the application of the American ripeness doctrine in Israel,
Justice Salim Jubran never explicitly adopted the “ripeness doctrine,
Israel style” – either in the Admissions Committees case or in the Electoral
Threshold case. In contrast to Justice Salim Jubran, Justice Asher
Grunis expressly adopted Justice Salim Jubran’s approach regarding
the existence of cases where it was not sufficient to demonstrate the
existence of a concrete factual basis in order to establish that a
particular petition was ripe for determination but that it was also
necessary to show a cumulative practice of infringement of a
protected right.77
Another point worth emphasizing is that both judges
favoured the view that the decision as to whether an issue was ripe
74
75
76
77

Id. at paras. 15, 17 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 17 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at paras. 5-7 (opinion of Jubran, J.).
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
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for hearing and determination had to be made within the context of
the first stage of the constitutional review process customarily
conducted in the Israeli legal system: namely, the stage at which the
Court considered whether a constitutional right or principle had been
infringed.78 This was another development of the ripeness doctrine,
which prima facie provoked a legal debate between the two judges, this
time concerning the standard of proof required to prove an
infringement of a constitutional right. Justice Asher Grunis held that
the petitioners bore the burden of proving a material violation or a
material infringement of a protected right or a material and patent
deviation from a constitutional principle.79 In contrast, Justice Salim
Jubran held that when the expected harm to an individual’s
constitutional right was of great magnitude and there was no
alternative procedure for hearing the claims, it was sufficient to
demonstrate real potential for violation of the right in order to enable
a hearing of the petition even before the constitutional violation had
actually occurred.80 I write ‘prima facie’ because Justice Asher Grunis
presented Justice Salim Jubran’s view as one which favoured in
principle and in general the test of real potential for violation of a
right,81 whereas Justice Salim Jubran’s stated position was in fact
limited only to those cases in which the magnitude of the anticipated
harm to a constitutional fundamental right of the individual was great
and there was no alternative procedure for determining the claim.82
In this debate between Justices Grunis and Salim Jubran, it is
appropriate to shine a spotlight on another matter upon which they
disagreed, this time concerning the implications of the application of
the ripeness doctrine for the case under discussion. While the two
judges concurred in the view that the outcome of dismissing the
petitions could lead to a fait accompli, which might justify a decision on
the merits of the petitions, even in the absence of a concrete factual

HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at para. 41 (opinion of Grunis, J.); id. at para. 8
(opinion of Jubran, J.).
79 Id. at para. 41 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
80 Id. at para. 17 (opinion of Jubran, J.).
81 Id. at para. 65 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
82 Id. at para. 17 (opinion of Jubran, J.).
78
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basis,83 Justice Asher Grunis stated that this was a temporary fait
accompli, while Justice Salim Jubran took the view it was a permanent
fait accompli, or at minimum a temporary but prolonged and
continuous fait accompli.84 In other words, Justice Asher Grunis
formed a view based on the forthcoming election campaign in
relation to the date of the hearing on the petitions in the case at hand,
and as such determined that it was a temporary fait accompli;85 whereas
Justice Selim Jubran focused on the term of the Knesset (four years),
and as such determined that it was a permanent fait accompli, or at least
a temporary but prolonged and continuous fait accompli.86 This
distinction between temporary harm and permanent harm – or, at
least, temporary but prolonged and continuous harm – is another
development of the ripeness doctrine.
Another interesting albeit not explicit development is
revealed in Justice Asher Grunis’ judgment. Even though Justice
Asher Grunis had dismissed the petitions by virtue of the ripeness
doctrine, he still methodically considered each of the petitioners’
arguments, discussed them and decided whether each of the issues
raised by these claims was premature or not.87 This process is clearly
reminiscent of the partial ripeness doctrine presented by Justice Neal
Handel in the Admissions Committees case.
With regard to the other judges on the bench ruling on these
petitions, it should be noted that although all, except Justice Salim
Jubran, concurred with the result reached by Justice Asher Grunis
regarding the dismissal of the petitions, not all were in agreement
regarding the path to this outcome. While Justices Hanan Melcer,
Neal Handel, Yoram Danziger, and Elyakim Rubinstein concurred
with Justice Asher Grunis’ arguments concerning the ripeness
doctrine, subject to a number of comments of their own, Justices Uzi

83

Id. at para. 60 (opinion of Grunis, J.); id. at para. 21 (opinion of Jubran,

84

Id.
Id. at para 60 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
Id. at para 21 (opinion of Jubran, J.).
Id. at paras. 48-49 (opinion of Grunis, J.).

J.).
85
86
87

24

2020

"UFO"

9:1

Vogelman and Miriam Naor88 agreed with Justice Salim Jubran that
the petitions were ripe for hearing and adjudication. However, unlike
Justice Salim Jubran, they held that the amendment to the Knesset
Election Law was proportionate, and as a corollary, constitutional.
Justice Yoram Danziger for his part sought to develop the
exception to the ripeness doctrine dealing with the existence of a
chilling effect.89 In his view, the chilling effect was potent precisely in
those cases where it might create a vicious circle in which it itself
prevented the establishment of the factual infrastructure.90 In his
view, a prime example of this was legislation that infringed the right
to freedom of expression.91
Reiterating the view, he had expressed in the Admissions
Committees case, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein again referred to the
common sense test, from which, among other things, he had derived
the ripeness doctrine.92
For his part, to further the caution he had previously voiced
in relation to the manner of implementation and scope of application
of the American ripeness doctrine in Israeli law,93 Justice Uzi
Vogelman again warned that the ripeness doctrine should not be used
as long as no definitive data was available regarding the constitutional
questions, as it was not always possible to achieve complete

88
Like Justices Uzi Vogelman, Miriam Naor, and Salim Jubran, Justice
Esther Hayut considered that the constitutional questions in the petitions were ripe
for determination. This was because raising the electoral threshold, irrespective of
the existence of a factual basis, infringed the principle of equality under Section 4
of Basic Law: the Knesset. In addition, in her opinion, in order for such an
infringement to be constitutional, it was not sufficient for the amendment to the
Knesset Election Law to pass the hurdle of the formal standard, it also had to
comply with the judicial limitation clause. Like Justices Vogelman and Naor, Justice
Esther Hayut considered that the amendment met all the conditions of the judicial
limitation clause. See Gutman, supra note 4, at para. 3 (opinion of Hayut, J.).
89 Id. (opinion of Danziger, J.).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at para. 7 (opinion of Rubinstein, J.).
93
See the opinions rendered by Justice Vogelman in HCJ 3803/11 Israel
Capital Mkt. Trs.’Ass’n and HCJ 2311/11 Sabah.
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certainty.94 In asserting this, Justice Uzi Vogelman referred to first
principles: namely, that the Court’s function was to decide the
petitions brought before it and the ripeness doctrine was an
exception to this rule. These two determinations presented an
important and critical development of the cautionary note previously
voiced by Justice Uzi Vogelman in relation to the manner and scope
of application of the ripeness doctrine. In any event, in substantive
terms, Justice Uzi Vogelman was of the opinion that the petitions
were ripe for deliberation and decision, mainly because the case at
hand was not one in which it was preferable to wait and examine how
the executive branch would implement the provisions of the law or
how the lower instance courts would give effect to the various
provisions.95 On the contrary, if anything, the existence of a chilling
effect was proven in the Electoral Threshold case, and this was because
the political actors had already adapted themselves to the new
normative situation.96 Nonetheless, Justice Uzi Vogelman considered
that, on the merits, the amendment to the Knesset Election Law met
the constitutional tests, whether these were formal in nature or
substantive in character.
Finally, the judgment of Justice Miriam Naor is particularly
interesting. On the one hand, in her view, the mere heightening of
the electoral threshold established a violation of the constitutional
principle that “every vote has equal weight,” protected under Section
4 of Basic Law: the Knesset, and consequently there was no need for
a concrete factual basis in order to decide the petitions on the merits;
in other words, the ripeness doctrine did not apply.97 On the other
hand, even though she took the view that the violation was
proportionate and met the tests of the judicial limitation clause,98 she
still chose to concur with the concluding segment in Justice Asher
Grunis’ judgment whereby dismissal of the petitions would not close
the doors to further examination of the amendment to the Knesset
Election Law, once the results of the elections to the Twentieth
See HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at para. 2 (opinion of Vogelman, J.).
Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Vogelman, J.).
96 Id.
97 Id. at paras. 1-3 (opinion of Naor, J.).
98 Id. at paras. 3-4. In Justice Miriam Naor’s view, in these types of cases,
the zone of proportionality available to the Knesset was particularly wide.
94
95
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Knesset were known. In her words, “these are matters in respect of
which trial and error are necessary.”99 This last proposition was one
with which Justice Uzi Vogelman and Justice Esther Hayut also
concurred.100
C. The Boycott Case101
This case dealt with the constitutionality of the Prevention of
Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott Law. This law
imposes liability in tort and various administrative sanctions against
anyone who knowingly publishes a public call for a boycott of the
State of Israel, within the meaning of the law. In the above case, three
sections of the law were subjected to constitutional scrutiny: Section
2, which deals with the imposition of civil tort liability, including
Section 2(c) providing for the imposition of damages which are
independent of the actual damage caused (hereinafter: punitive
damages); and Sections 3 and 4, which deal with the imposition of
administrative sanctions. Section 3 also confers authority on the
Minister of Finance, with the consent of the Minister of Justice and
with the approval of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of
the Knesset, to promulgate regulations for the implementation of
these sanctions.102 The term “boycott of the State of Israel” is defined
in Section 1 of this Law as “deliberately avoiding economic, cultural or
academic ties with another person or body solely because of their affinity with the
State of Israel, one of its institutions or an area under its control, in such a way
that may cause economic, cultural, or academic damage.”103
Reading the plethora of opinions presented in the judgment,
and insofar as concerns the question of the application of the
ripeness doctrine, Ariel Bendor rightly wrote that:

99
100

Id. at para. 7.
Id. at para. 6 (opinion of Vogelman, J.); id. at para. 4 (opinion of Hayut,

J.).
HCJ 5239/11 Avneri v. Knesset; see also The Prevention of Damage to
the State of Israel through Boycott Law, 5771 – 2011.
102 Id.
103
The Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott Law,
supra note 101, § 1.
101
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It is difficult to understand the opinions of some of the
judges [ . . . ] This difficulty stems from the fact that some of the
judges agreed with the views of other judges in this regard, but
described the position with which they concurred in a different
manner from that presented by other judges who advocated it.104
Ariel Bendor precisely described the ambiguity surrounding
the ripeness doctrine as expressed in the various opinions rendered
by the judges:
Three justices (President (Ret.) Grunis and Justices Melcer
and Amit) opined that in the future, based on concrete facts,
constitutional arguments could be raised against all four sections; two
justices (President Naor and Vice President Rubinstein) opined that it
would be impossible to raise constitutional arguments against any of
the sections (as opposed to arguments concerning the manner of
implementation of the law or the content of regulations or rules
promulgated thereunder), and apparently three other justices (Justices
Handel, Danziger and Vogelman), based on various substantive
analyses, left no opening for future constitutional reviews, beyond the
determinations in the Avneri judgment regarding the validity of
sections of the Boycott Law, while one justice (Justice Jubran) took
the view that in the future constitutional claims could be raised
against Sections 3 and 4.” (Emphasis in the original).105
Ariel Bendor argued that ultimately, the only consensus
reached by all the judges revolved around the unconstitutionality,
including the invalidity, of Section 2(c) of the Boycott Prevention
Law relating to punitive damages, as well as the dismissal of the
petitions insofar as they concerned Sections 3 and 4 of the law
regarding administrative sanctions. On the other hand, opinions were
divided relating to Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the law.106 The
fragmentation of the ripeness doctrine, as described here, indicates,
even if only prima facie the adoption of Justice Neal Handel’s
approach regarding the partial ripeness doctrine, as expressed in the
Admissions Committees case.
104
105
106

Bendor, supra note 7.
Id. at 49.
Id.

28

2020

"UFO"

9:1

After studying the various opinions in this case, it seems to
me that there are four points which should be emphasized. First, in
contrast to Justice Yoram Danziger, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein held
that it was insufficient to demonstrate a chilling effect in order to
bring about the application of the ripeness doctrine, for the relevant
question was one of the intensity of the chilling effect.107 Second, in
his judgment, Justice Yoram Danziger adopted the approach taken by
Justice Salim Jubran in the Tenders case, as reiterated by Justice Asher
Grunis in the Admissions Committees case, to the effect that there are
cases where it is not sufficient to demonstrate a concrete factual
basis, but it is also necessary to point to a cumulative practice of
infringement of a protected right.108 Third, Justice Yitzhak Amit
adopted Justice Miriam Naor’s approach, as expressed in the Nakba
case, regarding the possibility that, at the end of the day, the Minister
of Finance will not exercise his authority. Fourth, Justice Yoram
Danziger adopted and emphasized the goal of public confidence,
which Justice Eliezer Rivlin pointed to in the Securities case.109
IV. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE, ISRAEL STYLE: QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS
USE IN COMPARATIVE LAW
Appealing to comparative law in order to import legal
doctrines is a proper and worthy process. This is especially true when
dealing with constitutional law, which concerns constitutional issues
that are common to a wide range of states. Accordingly, an appeal to
comparative law may provide a judge deliberating a case with a
wealth of legal ideas, which ultimately assist him in deciding the
concrete issues before him.110 However, there is a gap, and properly
so, between the judge’s free academic ability to contemplate and
ponder legal theories and doctrines existing in comparative law and
his institutional and normative ability to adopt such doctrines intact,
within the framework of the local law in which he operates.
Institutionally, comparative law is not binding law in a foreign legal
system, so at most it may serve as a source of inspiration only for the
107
108
109
110

HCJ 5239/11 Avneri, at para. 14 (opinion of Rubinstein, J.).
Id. at para. 49 (opinion of Danziger, J.).
Id.
AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 290-291 (2004).
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judge who aspires to enrich his legal knowledge of shared legal issues.
Normatively, various legal systems are usually characterized by
substantive normative differences which require careful scrutiny prior
to the adoption of any legal doctrine. Moreover, the adoption of a
legal doctrine also requires adjustments to domestic law. In my view,
unlike the vertical relationship between international law and
domestic law, the relationship between comparative laws is
horizontal. In other words, one comparative law may serve as the
amicus curiae for another comparative law. Furthermore, an
examination of comparative law in relation to domestic law is not
much different from an examination of philosophical legal theories in
abstract terms. By this, I am seeking to say that not every theory,
however efficacious it may be, can justifiably be applied in every legal
system.
A. There Is Nothing New Under The Sun

When examining the manner in which the American ripeness
doctrine has been adopted and incorporated into Israeli law, the
warning signs to which I referred above, did not go unnoticed by the
Supreme Court justices. Notably, Justice Uzi Vogelman stressed the
need to reflect on the concept of introducing the American doctrine
intact into Israeli constitutional law, in light of the differences
between the respective characteristics of Israeli constitutional law and
American constitutional law. Like Justice Uzi Vogelman, Justice
Esther Hayut, in the Admissions Committees case,111 pointed out two
main points of distinction between the American legal system and the
Israeli legal system. First, the American ripeness doctrine is based on
a provision enshrined in the United States Constitution under which
the Court must avoid adjudicating abstract disputes devoid of any
real issues in contention, whereas the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style”
stems from the self-restraint which the Court may choose to impose
upon itself when exercising its powers under Sections 15(c) and 15(d)
of Basic Law: the Judiciary. Second, the implementation of threshold
criteria in Israeli law is more flexible.112 Nonetheless, the Supreme

111
112

HCJ 5744/16 Ben Meir v. The Knesset, Nevo Legal Database (2018).
Id.
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Court has never engaged in a thorough examination of the two legal
systems.
At the same time, a considerable discrepancy is evident
between the rhetoric of Justices Uzi Vogelman and Esther Hayut on
the one hand and the actual implementation of the doctrine on the
other. I would emphasize that the terminology coined by Justice
Asher Grunis in the Sabah case: “the ripeness doctrine, Israel style”
does not confer a genuinely Israeli character on the doctrine, with its
dual components, and in any event does not reflect a substantive
legal examination of the differences between the two legal systems
and their implications for the ripeness doctrine’s application in Israeli
law, as described by Justice Esther Hayut. Indeed, “the ripeness
doctrine, Israel style” is strikingly similar to the American formula, as
accurately presented by Elena Chachko in an article that was
published immediately after the Nakba case and the Tenders case, and,
as mentioned, prior to the Sabah case. In examining the extent to
which the ripeness doctrine conforms to constitutional law in Israel,
Elena Chachko traces the origins of the ripeness doctrine in
American law. In her view, the American ripeness doctrine – which
the Supreme Court in Israel sought to adopt, at least at the outset113 –
includes “substantive tests designed to assess the law on its merits,
which sometimes allow a decision ‘on the face of the law,’even before
it is implemented.”114 According to Elena Chachko, the United States’
test for the applicability of the ripeness doctrine is two-fold: first, ripe
petitions are those where the questions at issue are primarily legal and
not factual; second, an examination is conducted of the implications
and various interests attaching to the legal norm under review before
it is implemented, and the implications of deferring judicial review
until after it is implemented.115 According to Elena Chachko:
Even if the result of applying the ripeness doctrine is
the conclusion that it is premature to hear the
petition, this does not exclude a hearing on the
preliminary question as to whether there is room for
In other words, prior to the Admissions Committees case, the Electoral
Threshold case, and the Boycott case.
114
Chachko, supra note 11, at 439, 440-41.
115 Id. at 441.
113
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judicial review ‘on the face of the law’ because it
infringes a constitutional right. The question whether
a law infringes a constitutional right and the question
of ripeness are therefore two separate questions,
although they affect one another, and it is appropriate
for the Court to respond to both before deciding
whether to defer a determination on the
constitutionality of the law.116
We can see, therefore, that the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style,”
initially in the Sabah case (that is, following the publication of Elena
Chachko’s article), is not materially different to the American
doctrine.
An in-depth examination of Justice Asher Grunis’ judgment
in the Sabah case provides further support for this assertion. In his
ruling, Justice Asher Grunis emphasized his agreement with Justice
Uzi Vogelman’s comment in the Israel Capital Market Trustees
Association case,117 stating that the American ripeness doctrine should
not be imported into Israeli law, lock, stock and barrel. However, in
his view, the experience accumulated in the United States could be
used to help develop this doctrine in Israeli law.118 Accordingly,
Justice Asher Grunis sought to develop the “ripeness doctrine, Israel
style.”119 Yet, a perusal of the entirety of the judgment rendered by
Justice Asher Grunis, indicates that no “ripeness doctrine, Israel
style” was in fact developed, and that in essence his doctrine is the
same as that applied in the United States. Indeed, in response to the
question of when a petition would be deemed ripe for hearing, Justice
Asher Grunis referred to the American ripeness doctrine, including
the dual test as developed by the United States Supreme Court,120 and
as described above in Elena Chachko’s article. This dual test, as
espoused by the United States Supreme Court is at the crux of the
“ripeness doctrine, Israel style.”121 There is no basis, therefore, for
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 448.
See HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt. Trs.’Ass’n v. State of Israel.
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 21 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
Id. at para. 3 (Hayut, J., concurring).
Id. at para. 21; see also The Abbott, supra note 1.
Cf. HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at paras. 15-16.
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asserting that the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” is an Israeli
doctrine; rather, it does no more than incorporate the American
ripeness doctrine lock, stock and barrel into Israeli law.122
B. The Ripeness Doctrine: Contradicting Unique Trends in Israeli
Constitutional Law
The above discussion makes evident the need to understand
the essential differences between the American legal system and the
Israeli legal system prior to the incorporation of the ripeness doctrine
into Israeli law. As noted, Justice Esther Hayut pointed out two main
differences in this context, which can be addressed as follows.
With regard to the first issue, one may identify a new test of
adjudication, according to which the question of a statute’s
constitutionality is bound up with the question of its implementation.
This test deviates from the practice of Israeli law in relation to the
judicial review of statutes, which, for the most part, is applied
abstractly and without necessarily being tied to concrete
circumstances.123
With regard to the second issue, from the 1990s onwards,
there has been a clear trend towards increased flexibility regarding its
application, including the scope of application of traditional threshold
criteria – such as locus standi, good faith and more – in Israeli
constitutional law.124 This trend continues to this day, and therefore it
122
It should be noted that, in paras. 19-20, Grunis’ opinion does not
contain a discussion regarding differences between the American and Israeli legal
systems concerning the ripeness doctrine, including the extent of its application in
Israeli constitutional law. The discussion set out by Justice Asher Grunis in these
two paragraphs relates to his attempt to clarify the general distinction between the
process of judicial review in Israel and that applied in the United States. Put
differently, he sought to emphasize that the adoption of the American ripeness
doctrine into the local system did not constitute the indirect adoption of other
issues pertaining to the judicial review process in the United States, such as the
distinction between abstract judicial review and applied judicial review.
123
Chachko, supra note 11, at 433-36.
124 See,
e.g., AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: BASIC PRINCIPLES 177-180 (6th
ed. 2005); HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Def. 42(2) PD 441 (1988); HCJ
2148/94 Gelbert v. Hon. President of the Sup. Ct. and Chairman of the Inquiry
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is unclear why a new threshold criteria must be developed,
particularly in view of the current judicial trend to reduce the
application of the threshold criteria, and as a corollary expand the
right of access to the High Court of Justice. Underlying the factors
that have led to the reduced use of the traditional threshold criteria –
such as, judiciability, locus standi, tardiness, and more – are worthy
considerations, first and foremost among which is the principle of
the rule of law. Accordingly, and as long as the Court does not intend
to deviate from this principle, it would seem that the incorporation of
the ripeness doctrine into Israeli law is artificial and stands in sharp
contradiction not only to the prevailing trend of using traditional
threshold criteria for the past two decades, but particularly to the
principle of the rule of law on which this trend is founded. I shall
address the latter matter regarding the rule of law with greater vigour
in the last section of this article.
In this state of affairs, before the Israeli Supreme Court has
considered the crucial institutional and normative differences
between the American and Israeli legal systems insofar as concerns
the constitutional legal issues pertaining to the ripeness doctrine, it
seems that the very act of importing it, never mind adopting and
applying it, is itself problematic. Further, and more substantively, as
previously demonstrated, in my opinion, the American ripeness
doctrine is alien to Israeli constitutional law; it inexplicably deviates
from the constitutional practice applied in Israel to judicial review,
and it stands in sharp contradiction to the tendency to dampen the
application of the threshold criteria in Israeli constitutional law.
C. The Ripeness Doctrine, Israel style – Lost in a Sea of Goals
An examination of the case law in the context of which the
ripeness doctrine has developed in Israeli law reveals that this
Committee to Investigate the Massacre in Hebron 48(3) PD 573 (1994); HCJ
651/03 Ass’n for C.R. in Israel v. Chairman of the Central Election Committee for
the Sixteenth Knesset 57(2) PD 62 (2003); HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of
Def. 48(2) PD 811; HCJ 852/86 Aloni v. Minister of Just. 41(2) PD 1 (1987); HCJ
1/81 Sheeran v. Broadcasting Authority 35(3) PD 365 (1999); HCJ 1635/90
Zarzevski v. The Prime Minister 45(1) PD 749 (1991); HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. The
Gov’t of Israel 40(3) PD 505 (1986).
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development has not only circled around questions concerning the
manner and extent of the doctrine’s application, but also to its
purposes. This last issue in turn has had a considerable impact on the
scope of these developments and the way in which the doctrine has
been implemented. Patently, the case law concerned does not contain
an in-depth debate between the judges regarding these underlying
purposes, either in relation to the actual recognition of them or in
relation to their scope and the implications of adopting them.
In the Disengagement case, Justice Miriam Naor, in an
individual opinion, characterized the purpose of the ripeness doctrine
as providing a tool for regulating the stream of referrals to the Court.
Later, in the Nakba case, Justice Miriam Naor – with whom, this time,
Justices Dorit Beinisch and Eliezer Rivlin concurred – expanded the
spectrum of goals motivating the ripeness doctrine, and described the
doctrine as necessary to save judicial time and increase efficiency, out
of the hope that the statutory provision under review would become
a dead letter; whether due to the Finance Minister’s choice to refrain
from exercising his statutory authority or because of the application
of the clauses in a way that would not harm the petitioners, or for any
other reason. Following this, in the Securities case, Justice Eliezer
Rivlin, presiding, sought to broaden the spectrum of purposes
necessitating the adoption of the ripeness doctrine even further, this
time in reliance primarily on the principle of the separation of
powers. In his view, it was necessary to confine judicial intervention
to cases where the dispute was concrete, as public confidence in the
Courts was enhanced when judicial intervention was aimed at
preventing an actual violation of fundamental rights.
In my opinion, a thorough examination of each of the above
purposes highlights constitutional and practical difficulties with
regard to their adoption in connection with the ripeness doctrine.
Nonetheless, I wish to clarify already that I do not contend that these
purposes are improper, rather, my argument is that these are
problematic goals to the declared need to import the American
ripeness doctrine into Israeli constitutional law.

35

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

9:1

1. Saving Judicial Time And Increasing Efficiency – Indeed? A Tool
For Regulating The Stream Of Referrals To The Court – How?
In none of the latter three legal cases in which the ripeness
doctrine was considered and the petitions dismissed primarily
because of this doctrine was any judicial time whatsoever saved or
any financial resources preserved. Each of these cases involved a
number of hearings and the ensuing judgments covered hundreds of
pages.125 Furthermore, even when some of the judges relied on the
ripeness doctrine, they still, for some reason, chose to state their
position on the merits of the petition itself, in preparation for the
next petition which might be brought before them once the issues
matured in the future.
Therefore, judicial time was not saved, nor efficiency
increased. On the contrary, considerable precious judicial time was
invested in the deliberations and decisions on the merits of the
petitions, which, at least based on the rationale underlying their
dismissal, was not really necessary. This was because the Court was
faced with a threshold criterion pursuant to which the decision on
the petitions could have been deferred, without recourse to the legal
polemic that was laid out over the hundreds of pages in question.
Moreover, the detailed constitutional discussion conducted within the
context of these rulings essentially invited the parties to revert back
to the Court in the event that the statutes, which were the subject of
the petitions, were not interpreted or implemented according to the
standards proposed by the Court itself.
If the doctrine is indeed concerned with regulating the stream
of referrals to the Supreme Court, it would seem that Yitzhak Zamir
was right in arguing that adopting the ripeness doctrine in Israeli law
has not in fact created any added value or benefit. After all, there are
already other threshold criteria that support the purposes underlying
the ripeness doctrine as a threshold criterion per se; for example, the
Nonetheless, one cannot deny the possible argument that while the
judgments which established the ripeness doctrine in Israel contain lengthy
discussions – therefore making it doubtful that judicial time was saved or judicial
resources preserved for vital cases – the principle itself, once formulated, will lead
to these results in the future, in terms of creating a chilling effect.
125
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threshold criteria regarding premature petitions, abstract petitions,
theoretical petitions, and more. Additionally, according to Yitzhak
Zamir, damage – or, at least, considerable difficulty – follows from
the doctrine’s adoption in Israel. Thus, for example, it makes the legal
process more complex and impairs the certainty and clarity of the
law, especially in discussing questions relating, to the relationship
between the ripeness doctrine and the other threshold criteria.126
2. The Respect Clause And The Hope That The Law Will Become A
Dead Letter
From a legal point of view, the Court’s refusal to engage in a
substantive constitutional hearing, as a result of its aspiration, or
perhaps hope, that over time the need to decide the fundamental
issue would be obviated – whether due to the decision of the
Minister Finance not to exercise his authority under the law, or by
reason of the statutes’ implementation in such a manner as not to
harm the petitioners, or for some other reason – is very problematic,
and even contradicts the ‘respect clause’ in Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty. First, this position reflects the view that no
distinction should be made between judicial review of a statute’s
constitutionality, on the one hand, and constitutional review of the
manner of its application, on the other.127 Second, it sends the
ostensible message that, unlike the executive branch, the legislature is
not subject to the constitutional criteria of the limitation clause.128 In
this last context, it is worth recalling the basic tenet posited by Justice
Uzi Vogelman, whereby it is the Court’s function to decide petitions
coming before it, inter alia, by virtue of the ‘respect clause’ in Section
11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which states that “each

126
ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1896-97. It should be noted that Itzkak Zamir
did not completely negate the very existence of the ripeness doctrine; his criticism
was focused on its existence in Israeli law. In the Admissions Committees case, Justice
Asher Grunis stated, without elaborating further, that the ripeness doctrine is a
private instance of a threshold criteria regarding premature petitions. What does it
mean: “a private instance of another threshold criteria?” What are the similarities or
differences between the general threshold criteria regarding premature petitions and
the concrete instance of the ripeness doctrine?
127
Bendor, supra note 7, at 49.
128 Id. at 52-53.
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and every government authority is bound to respect the rights under
this Basic Law.”
In terms of judicial review of the legislature, it is noteworthy
that in the Mizrahi Bank case,129 the Court emphasized the substantive
status of the ‘respect clause,’ outlined the scope of its application to
the legislature, and listed the criteria for its applicability in accordance
with the limitation clause. In the Mizrahi Bank case, the Court itself
relied on the ‘respect clause’ to explain: first, the legislature’s duty to
respect protected rights; and second, the judiciary’s duty to respect
protected rights by preventing other governmental authorities,
including the legislature, from violating these rights otherwise in
accordance with the limitation clause.
As to the legislature’s duty to respect protected rights, I
believe that the adoption of the ripeness doctrine is at odds with the
‘respect clause,’ both in relation to the exercise or non-exercise of
judicial review of the legislature, and in relation to the nature of the
Court’s authority to exercise judicial review. In my opinion, the
manner in which the legislature is bound to respect protected rights is
by enacting laws in accordance with the criteria outlined in the
limitation clause. In my view, the legislature violates a protected right
by the process of enacting laws that restrict protected rights, for
example, through criminal, civil, or administrative law. In such cases,
the question is, as noted, whether or not this legislation meets the
conditions of the limitation clause. Further, the ‘respect clause’ does
not make the legislature’s duty to respect protected rights conditional
upon the intensity of the injury, or the existence of a tangible injury,
or the existence of a cumulative practice of injury, nor in any event
does it make it contingent upon the manner in which the responsible
Minister chooses to implement the law. With all due respect, it seems
to me that in relation to the ripeness doctrine, the discussion held by
the Court, as described above, is very problematic. For example, in
the Nakba case, it appears that while the petition was directed at the
legislature and the constitutionality of the statutes enacted by it, the
Court actually chose to divert the spotlight on to the arena of the
129 See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Vill.,
Nevo Legal Database (1995).
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executive branch and examine the constitutionality of the exercise of
its powers as these had been conferred through Knesset legislation.
In that case, Justice Miriam Naor did not explain, at any point, how
the ripeness doctrine was compatible, for example, with the ‘respect
clause.’130 The question faced by the Court in that case was one of the
constitutionality of the Minister of Finance’s authority to cancel the
budgets, inter alia, of institutions that marked the day of the
establishment of the State of Israel as a day of mourning. This may
be a constitutional question of the first importance concerning the
freedom of expression of budgeted institutions, but has no relevance
to the question of the actual or manner of exercise of the Minister of
Finance’s authority.
As to the duty of the judiciary to respect protected rights by
preventing other government authorities, including the legislature,
from violating these rights otherwise than in accordance with the
limitation clause, it is evident that the respect clause is also of vital
importance to the judiciary itself. The power of the Supreme Court to
exercise judicial review over the legislature is not really a discretionary
power. In fact, the “respect clause” imposes a duty on the Court to
respect the protected rights. When the Court refrains from exercising
judicial review over any of the government authorities, it infringes
protected rights, even if it is not refusing to exercise judicial review
but merely delaying it. Ultimately:
This Court is not concerned with the ‘battle for
control’ but with imposing the supremacy of the rule
of law and the subordination of all state authorities to
the law.131

130
§ 11, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, SH 5752 (1992) (Isr.); see
also Judith Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles,
1(2) MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 323, 373 (1993) (even then, Karp pointed out that the
expression “government authority” should be interpreted as also including the
legislative authority).
131
HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party 49(1) PD
758, 809 (1995).
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3. The Principle Of The Separation Of Powers And Enhanced Public
Confidence In The Judiciary
In any event, I am not certain upon what foundation the
Court has based its assumption that if it were to confine its review of
the legislative authority – as opposed to the executive branch – to
cases where the dispute is concrete, that this would lead to increased
public confidence in the judiciary. This assumption is purely
speculative. Indeed, where the judiciary enjoys the public’s trust, this
is certainly welcome. However, the jurisdiction of the Court should
be exercised in accordance with a clear and precise compass that
guides it in the discharge of its duty under the “respect clause” and in
accordance with its authority under Section 15(c) of Basic Law: The
Judiciary. The Court’s jurisdiction cannot be exercised in accordance
with an arbitrary standard which at best may be likened to a kite
blown by political winds in the public sphere. In my opinion, the
Supreme Court was right in the past when it came out against the
idea of feedback in respect of judicial performance, and it would do
well to leave the issue of public confidence, in the sense presented by
the Court, outside the bounds of legitimate judicial policy
considerations. Be that as it may, it can easily be seen that the
judiciary enjoys a higher degree of public confidence than the other
government authorities, even in the post-Mizrahi Bank case era,
including the constitutional revolution before it. To all this, one must
add that, at the end of the day, all sectors of the population in Israel –
right, left, and centre; Jews and Arabs; secular and religious and more
– find refuge in the Supreme Court, and are able to obtain legal relief
against the legislative and executive authorities whenever they believe
that they have been harmed by the activities of these authorities.
Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever that the public’s
confidence in the Court has increased due to the rejection of the
above petitions by virtue of the ripeness doctrine. In fact, I am not at
all certain that the public is even aware of the legal issues which
underlay the petitions discussed here, or the ensuing determinations
or ramifications of the petitions’ dismissal.
By this I do not mean to say that no importance should be
attached to the principle of the separation of powers, nor that we
should ignore the interest in augmenting public trust in the judiciary;
40
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however, a more fundamental understanding of this principle and
interest requires a different conclusion to be drawn than that reached
by the Supreme Court on the ripeness doctrine.
Indeed, at its core, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s
authority to examine the constitutionality of statutes is drawn from
the fulfilment of the constitutional principle of the separation of
powers, but this is true in the substantive sense; that is, in the sense
of checks and balances, and not necessarily in the sense of reducing
friction in the interrelations between the judiciary and the
legislature.132
As for the public trust in the judiciary, certainly the most
important commodity in the judge’s arsenal is the public’s trust.
Without public trust, the judge cannot judge. He, the judge, holds
neither a sword nor a wallet. All he has is the public’s confidence in
him. This is an asset which the judge must guard with all his might.133
However, public trust in this context means that the public’s belief
that the judge is rendering justice on the face of the law, and not the
public’s conviction that the judge is refraining from clashing with the
legislature. In the words of Aharon Barak, the need to ensure public
trust in the judiciary does not mean the need to ensure popularity.134
Either way, protecting minority rights is by definition unpopular
because it serves the minority, occasionally at the expense of the
majority. However, in a democratic regime, the Court must ensure
that minority rights are not violated, especially when the legislature is
unable to provide that guarantee in a system based on majority rule in
the most formal sense.

See RUBINSTEIN& MEDINA, supra note 115, at 127-28.
AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 292-93 (Papyrus 1987); HCJ
73/85 Kach Faction v. The Knesset Speaker 39(3) PD 141, 158 (1985); HCJ
306/81 Platto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee 35(4) PD 118, 158 (1981); HCJ
5364/94 Velner, at 788.
134
BARAK, supra note 124, at 292.
132
133
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V. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE, ISRAEL STYLE: AMBIGUITY,
INCONSISTENCY, AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Even if I was willing to accept the principle of the ripeness
doctrine, which I am not, the tests offered in the case law, and
especially the mode of their application, remain problematic, vague,
and a source of legal uncertainty. The following examples illustrate
this claim.
A. A Concrete Factual Basis Versus A Cumulative Practice Of
Infringement Of A Right
In one place, the Court held that in the absence of a concrete
set of facts the petition would not be ripe for constitutional
examination;135 however, Justice Salim Jubran added in the Tenders
case that even when there was such a set of facts, a proven practice
of infringement of the relevant right would also be required.136 This
was a position with which Justice Asher Grunis later concurred in the
Admissions Committees case.137 In other words, according to this
approach, even when there is a proven violation of a constitutional
right, one which has occurred in a clear factual context, still, in the
absence of a proven practice of such violations, the Court will refrain
from deciding the fundamental constitutional question. It is not at all
clear on what theoretical juridical basis the Court has taken this
position. Moreover, this legal position could prejudice a petitioner,
ignore his complaint, and, even worse, use him as a tool and as a
means of achieving an extraneous objective – namely, the purposes
underlying the ripeness doctrine.138

See for instance, HCJ 7190/05 Lobel.
AAA 7201/11 Rahmani.
137
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
138
This state of affairs raises numerous important questions regarding the
proportionality of the ripeness doctrine; however, these questions exceed the scope
of this article.
135
136
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B. The Existence Of An Alternative Process? Depends On Which
Case!
In the Electoral Threshold case, Justice Salim Jubran ruled that
the existence of an alternative process for conducting a more
effective examination of the claims could have implications for the
issue of the applicability of the ripeness doctrine.139 However, this
consideration had not guided him in the earlier Tenders case, where,
apparently no alternative procedure was actually available. The Tenders
case was heard as an appeal against an administrative petition; that is
to say, that was the alternative procedure per se. Still, Justice Selim
Jubran chose to take a minority viewpoint, adopting the ripeness
doctrine wholeheartedly and, moreover, expanding the scope of its
application.140 Similarly, the consideration regarding the existence of
an alternative process was disregarded by Justice Salim Jubran in the
Admissions Committees case. There, if Justice Salim Jubran had been
compelled to consider the issue of the existence of an alternative
process, he most probably would have concurred with the majority
opinion and dismissed the petitions against the Admissions
Committees Law. This is because, according to the statutory
provisions in the Admissions Committees case, an alternative process
had been put in place to hear claims, including the possibility of
attacking the decisions of the admissions committees and the appeal
committees above them, before the Administrative Affairs Court, and
from there to the Supreme Court – whether by right or by leave of
the Court – in accordance with the substantive legal issues involved.
Moreover, according to the provisions of Section 6 of the
Administrative Affairs Courts Law, 5760-2000:
Where an Administrative Affairs Court finds, upon
the application of a party, the Attorney General, or at
its own initiative, that an administrative petition
before it raises a matter of particular importance,
sensitivity or urgency, it may, after receiving the
parties’ response, order the transfer of the hearing on

139
140

HCJ 3166/14 Gutman.
AAA 7201/11 Rahmani.
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the petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High
Court of Justice.
It follows that Justice Salim Jubran’s concern that the fundamental
matter in dispute would not come before him again was completely
unfounded. Moreover, one may legitimately wonder whether this last
concern is one that the Supreme Court may properly assert as a
justifiable legal reason for judicial intervention when alternative
judicial proceedings can be pursued before other courts, which are
also empowered to hear the fundamental arguments that form the
subject-matter of the legal proceedings.141
Either way, the interesting point is that the Court’s discussion
of the existence of an alternative process was not at all
comprehensive. The Disengagement case, for example, points to the
existence of an alternative procedure for arguing against the
constitutionality of the penal provision under that law. However,
Justice Miriam Naor did not examine the outcome and ramifications
of a direct assault as opposed to an indirect assault on the statutory
provision. Further, under the legal position currently prevailing in
Israel, trial courts have the power to exercise constitutional review of
statutory provisions during the course of hearing the concrete case
before them, in reality the trial courts in Israel are not eager to engage
in a constitutional discussion of the constitutionality of any particular
statutory provision. This is true generally, and even more so with
regard to penal provisions.
C. Ripeness? It Depends On Whom You Ask And In What Case!
In the first phase of the two-stage examination in the Sabah
case, Justice Asher Grunis was required to consider the Prison
Privatization case as an example of a situation in which the Court
could determine that the major portion of the question raised by the
petition was fundamentally legal and therefore future factual
developments would not contribute to the judicial decision. At the
I wish to emphasize that the position I have stated above should not be
taken to mean that I do not agree with the legal outcome reached by Justice Salim
Jubran in the Admissions Committees case; however, it is not the question of the
existence of the alternative remedy which guides me in this analysis.
141
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same time, Justice Asher Grunis did not explain how the Prison
Privatization case differed, if at all, from the Admissions Committees case
or the Electoral Threshold case.142 This is particularly so in light of
Justice Asher Grunis’ remarks in the Admissions Committees case that
the relevant statute regarding the privatization of prisons had not yet
been implemented and that the risks pointed to by the petitioners
were merely in the nature of a possibility, as well as that the statute
contained various defense mechanisms for the protection of
prisoners’ rights and the supervision of these prisons.143 It should be
emphasized that, in his remarks, this case was cited as an example of
a situation in which any future implementation of the statute could
still raise the constitutional question that needed to be discussed; and
therefore, the question of implementation was irrelevant.144 He did
this in order to obviate the need to address the position taken by
Justice Edmund Levy, who held in the Prison Privatization case that
since the statute had not yet been implemented, the time was not yet
ripe to decide its constitutionality, and in the picturesque language of
Justice Edmund Levy:
As judicial review cannot rely on a loose assessment,
my position is that it should be left until the proper
time, and that is not the point in time at which we are
today. We are therefore dealing with an egg that has
not yet hatched. Whether it be a good day upon
which it comes into the world or not, whether it be
edible or not, we do not yet know.145
Further, in the second phase of the two-stage examination in the
Admissions Committees case, Justice Asher Grunis outlined the reasons
for the chilling effect of the statute, fear that the deferral of judicial
review would lead to irreversible facts on the ground, or the existence
of a significant public interest in hearing the petition even before the
implementation of the statute. This is the place to ask: was the
Boycott Law incapable of leading to a chilling effect? Once the
HCJ 2311/11 Sabah.
See HCJ 2605/05 The Academic Center for Law and Business v. The
Minister of Finance, 63(2) PD 545.
144 Id.
145 Id. at para. 11 (opinion of Levy, J.).
142
143
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petitions against raising the electoral threshold were dismissed, did
this not create irreversible facts on the ground? And, was there no
clear significant public interest in examining the constitutionality of
the Nakba Law and the Admissions Committees Law?!
Additionally, while in the Disengagement case the ripeness
doctrine was applied in “all its glory” despite the existence of a
criminal sanction (six months imprisonment),146 in the Nakba case,
Justice Miriam Naor noted that had the Independence Day bill been
passed, which also included a criminal sanction (three years
imprisonment), it was likely that the Court would not have given
consideration to the ripeness doctrine.147 It is not clear, therefore,
whether it is the very existence of the criminal sanction which
determines the question of the applicability or inapplicability of the
ripeness doctrine, or the severity of the sanction. And, if it is the
latter, it is not clear that a six-month sentence is not a harsh
punishment! Generally speaking, it is likely that in both cases the
person subject to the criminal sanctions is of normative character, for
whom a prison sentence is potentially devastating, whether it be
imprisonment behind lock and key or merely a sentence carried out
through community service. Either way, in my opinion, the criminal
conviction, and accompanying stigma, is so severe that they require a
substantive constitutional hearing irrespective of the issue of the
actual punishment meted out.
Moreover, in the Electoral Threshold case, not only did Justice
Asher Grunis seek to decide the issue in contention using the twostage test of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style,” which he had
presented in the Admissions Committees case, but after holding that the
petitions did not meet the first stage of the doctrine, he for some
reason did not consider (or even partially consider) the second stage
of the test. In the second stage, Justice Asher Grunis was supposed
to examine a number of possible justifications for deciding the
petitions on the merits, despite the absence of a factual basis. Among
these justifications, Justice Asher Grunis himself had already
mentioned in the Admissions Committees case the fear that the deferral
146
147

HCJ 7190/05 Lobel.
HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n.
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of the judicial review would lead to the creation of irreversible facts
on the ground. Except that this hurdle was, apparently, swiftly met,
through his assertion that it was a temporary fait accompli! Temporary?
How?!
Another example may be seen in the positions taken by
Justices Uzi Vogelman, Miriam Naor, and Esther Hayut in the
Electoral Threshold case, where they held that raising the electoral
threshold per se established a violation of the principle of electoral
proportionality, as protected in Section 4 of Basic Law: the Knesset.
This, as mentioned, was prior to considering the question of the
limitation clause. However, none of them wondered in relation to the
Admissions Committees case, whether the very empowerment of the
admissions committees to reject applicants by their incompatibility
with the fabric of life in any particular communal village, was capable
of establishing a violation of the constitutional right to equality – be it
proportionate or disproportionate.
D. Between The Psychoanalysis Of The Legislature And The
Analysis Of The Law
A further demonstration of judicial uncertainty may be found
in the Admissions Committees case, in which Justice Elyakim Rubinstein
expressly disapproved the practice of referring to statements made by
those who had initiated or advocated the legislative amendment
concerning the charge of hidden bias, finding support in Justice
Aharon Barak’s remark that, at the end of the day, we are concerned
with “an analysis of the law and not the psychoanalysis of the
legislature.”148 Yet, suddenly, in the Electoral Threshold case, Justice
Elyakim Rubinstein did in fact turn to legislative psychoanalysis when
he referred to all of the Knesset’s records to hold that it was clear
that some of those who had initiated the amendment genuinely
believed that the faulty state governance could be improved by means

HCJ 246/81 Agudat Derech Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority 35(4) PD
1, 17 (1981). This remark was also cited by Justice Asher Grunis. See HCJ 3166/14
Gutman, at para. 26 (opinion of Grunis, J.).
148
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of enacting the amendment and concomitant increase of the electoral
threshold.149
E. ON RIPENESS AND COMMON SENSE
In both the Admissions Committees case and the Electoral
Threshold case, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein presented the common
sense test for deciding whether to adopt the ripeness doctrine,
including the extent and manner of such adoption. Nonetheless, it is
unclear what Justice Elyakim Rubinstein meant when he referred to
the common-sense test, nor did he explain how it should be applied
in practice. In other words, what were the criteria for applying this
test? Was it an objective or a subjective test? How could he explain
the fact that some judges were not of the opinion that the petitions
were still premature for constitutional determination? Could each and
every judge exercise a different type of common sense to that of his
colleagues?
These five examples illustrate the assertion that the adoption
of the ripeness doctrine, and its implementation in the case law, has
created uncertainty, a lack of uniformity and, certainly, undermined
public confidence. Further, the purposes of the doctrine have not
been realized in practice, and there are alternative legal instruments
for achieving these purposes.
E. Instead of a Conclusion: Judicial Diplomacy
Legal scholars are unanimous in their view that the reason
underlying the adoption of the ripeness doctrine in Israeli
constitutional law is the judiciary’s desire to avoid friction with the
legislature.150 This is particularly true of petitions dealing with divisive
social, ideological, and policy issues.151 This position is consistent
with Justice Rivlin’s remarks that judicial review of the legislature
should be confined solely to cases where there is a genuine dispute –
a move that would inevitably lead to an increase in public confidence
in the judiciary.
149
150
151

HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at para. B (opinion of Rubinstein, J.).
Barak-Erez, supra note 8.
ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1896.
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It seems, therefore, that when the ripeness doctrine was
adopted, the Court took a number of huge steps backwards,
retreating into the era preceding the Mizrahi Bank case, when judicial
review was confined to the executive branch. Is this really true? The
answer is: not necessarily. In his book, The Judge in a Democracy,
Aharon Barak wrote: “Activism or self-restraint are relevant concepts
only when there is judicial discretion.”152 And in terms of judicial
discretion, it should be noted that the power to shape it – particularly
in the absence of explicit (or basic) legislation – is confined
exclusively to the Court itself. In my opinion, Dr. Adam Shinar
rightly argues that despite the adoption of the ripeness doctrine, the
Supreme Court has not yet abandoned norlimited the trend towards
expanding the traditional threshold criteria, particularly those relating
to locus standi and justiciability. In Dr. Adam Shinar’s view, largely in
response to Yitzhak Zamir, the reason why the Court has actually
chosen to apply the ripeness doctrine rather than the traditional
threshold criteria, such as locus standi, is the advantage found in using
the ripeness doctrine, which allows the Court to dismiss petitions on
an individual basis in light of the factual circumstances of the case
before it, without such dismissal fettering the Court in the future.153
Taking a similar approach to Adam Shinar, Ariel Bendor has,
in his writings, identified a number of advantages to be gained from
incorporating the ripeness doctrine into Israeli law. In his view,
through the use of the ripeness doctrine, the Court can expand the
scope of judicial review by developing a discourse that relates not
only to a statute’s constitutionality but also to the constitutionality of
its implementation and, concomitantly, expand the constitutional
restrictions on laws.154 Ariel Bendor illustrates this last issue by citing
the Electoral Threshold case and the Boycott case.155
In another article, Ariel Bendor and Tal Sela argue that the
expansion of judicial discretion is not only reflected in the adoption
of the ripeness principle, but also in the choice of whether or not to
implement it. In other words, there may be instances where the Court
152
153
154
155

BARAK, supra note 102, at 390.
Shinar, supra note 8.
Bendor, supra note 7, at 51.
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will be ready to hear a petition on the merits even if it is still
premature.156
For myself, I would like to portray the incorporation of the
ripeness doctrine into Israeli constitutional law as a form of judicial
diplomacy in the sense of tactical judicial review, which creates,
through the executive branch, an indirect constitutional dialogue with
the legislature.157 This judicial diplomacy is possible precisely because
of the parliamentary characteristics of Israeli democracy, according to
which the members of the executive branch are, for the most part,
also legislative members. In other words, in light of the fact that, in
terms of personalities, most legislative members are also members of
the executive branch, it is sufficient to transmit critical messages to
members of the executive branch and thereby avoid undesirable
friction with the legislature. Either way, at the end of the day, the
final decision as to whether to intervene when examining the
constitutionality of a statutory provision – and if so, in what way –
remains in the hands of the Court itself; if it so wishes, the petition
will be considered ripe; if it decides otherwise, it will be deemed
premature; and, if it so wishes, the Court will hear and decide the
petition even if it is premature, in accordance with the varied
exceptions the Court has developed for itself.
This judicial diplomacy is the direct result of the continuing
threats emanating from the political authorities which oppose the
Court’s decisions and untiringly seek to weaken it.158 This state of
affairs is extremely dangerous, both because it blurs the boundaries
between the legislative and the executive branches, including in
judicial review, and because the Court may lose its equilibrium due to
its attempts to survive the political threats that seek to erode its
156 See also Ariel Bendor & Tal Sela, Judicial Discretion: The Third Era, 46
MISHPATIM 605, 630-32 (2018). Ariel Bendor and Tal Sela argue that “the
expansion of judicial discretion is not reflected solely in the adoption of the
ripeness ruling but also in the choice whether to implement it.” Id. In other words,
there may be cases where the Court will hear the petition on the merits even if it is
premature.
138 See

also Navot, supra note 9, at 123-25; Ronen Poliak, Relative Ripeness: Implement or
Abstract Constitutional Judicial Review, 37 MISHPAT 45, 62-63 (2014).
158
Shinar, supra note 8.
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powers. This is especially true when we are concerned with the
protection
of
the
substantive
democratic-constitutionalcharacteristics of the State of Israel.
F. Epilogue
Particularly in the past decade, a public-legal discourse was
conducted in the State of Israel regarding the interrelations between
the central government authorities; the judiciary on the one hand and
the legislative and executive branches on the other hand. This
discourse is being conducted against the backdrop of the tension that
is influenced by claims of judicial activism, assertions of legislative
activism, and misgivings about activism in privatization. This tension
is rooted in a competition between the separation of powers in its
formal sense, i.e. complete separation of government authority, and in
the substantive sense, i.e. creation of relations based on mutual
oversight and checks and balances between these authorities. In
addition, this tension flourishes in the light of two polar-opposite
perceptions concerning the principle of the rule of law: at one end,
demanding adherence to the rule of primary legislation, however
unjust and unfair it may be; and, at the other end, demanding the
subjugation of the positive law to the basic values and principles that
guarantee a degree of fairness and justice for everyone, and
particularly for those who are unable to obtain such justice from the
legislative authority itself.
This tension has existed since the founding of the State of
Israel, but has intensified – and become more prominent – following
the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and,
particularly, following the publication of the judgment in the Mizrachi
Bank case, when the Basic Laws were granted supra-statutory
constitutional status.
This tension does not trouble me. On the contrary, its
existence is actually a confirmation of the health of Israeli society.
However, the scope, extent, and manner of managing this tension are
the issues which provide justifiable cause for anxiety, and all of these
together predict the worst for the country’s future. In any healthy
society that seeks to eradicate elements of tyranny and governmental
corruption, it is imperative that there be tension between those
51
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responsible for the legal system and the politicians. This tension is
the result of the inherent difference in the nature of the interests of
each of the governmental authorities. Nonetheless, even when this
type of tension is experienced, it should be constructive rather than
destructive, reasonable rather than arbitrary, and proportionate rather
than extreme. A positive discourse can only take place where society
adopts a steady, solid, repertory of values and fundamental principles
that guide all governmental authorities in a similar manner,
irrespective of the narrow considerations and interests of each of
these authorities.
In recent years, however, we have witnessed legislative
activism, evidence apparently of the parliamentarians. Moreover,
even the executive branch suffers from activism in privatization, for
example, by way of indifferently privatizing essential services which
become the object of narrow business considerations. These last two
phenomena are manifestations of a worrying governmental
perception prioritizing the removal of fetters from the exercise of
governmental authority, precisely because the members of these
governmental authorities are representatives of the people (so it is
claimed) that they are free to legislate whatever they see fit or manage
state matters as they deem proper.
This perception is fundamentally mistaken. It is no more than
a narrow formal understanding of the concept of democracy. The
political authorities have apparently forgotten the words of
Montesquieu, whereby:
Political liberty is to be found only in moderate
governments . . . but constant experience shews us
that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it
. . . To prevent this abuse, it is necessary, from the
very nature of things, power should be a check to
power.”159
The rule of law in its substantive sense is therefore concerned with
the desire for governmental acts to fulfil certain basic requirements.
159
CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON
SPIRIT OF LAWS 197 (T. Evans 1777).
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These are requirements designed to guarantee the internal morality of
the law, which is vital to ensure that the public feels a commitment to
the law and complies with its provisions out of a recognition of its
binding validity. Adherence to these principles is intended to enable
the law to fulfill its purpose as a social institution, the goal of which is
to enable collaborative human existence, increase the public’s sense
of security and protect individual freedoms. Respect for the rule of
law is a prerequisite for ensuring the legitimacy of law enforcement
among members of the public subordinate to the law.160 In this
context, I am not referring to the term “law” in its narrow sense
(Gesetz, in German; loi, in French; ley, in Spanish; and law, in English),
but in the broad sense, which can even be equated with “justice:” law
which is mandatory, not because it has been enacted in a proper
formal process by a lawfully elected legislature, but precisely because
it is just and correct (Recht, in German; droit, in French; derecho, in
Spanish; and law, in English).161
It follows, therefore, that the rule of law, in its formal sense,
is the rule of law enacted in a lawful form by a lawfully elected
legislature that can fulfill its role as a legislature. In contrast, the rule
of substantive law is the rule of just and proper law. At the heart of
these concepts is the distinction between formal democracy and
substantive democracy. While formal democracy is solely interested
in the majority opinion and seeks to enforce its decisions, be they
good or bad, substantive democracy respects the majority’s opinion
while concurrently protecting the minorities within it (the weaker
groups), particularly where the majority seeks to misuse its rights in
its capacity as the majority, in order to oppress those weaker groups.
Elsewhere, I wrote:
The Athenian state had a constitution and a supreme
court. Neither Socrates nor Plato critized democracy
as such. Socrates was inciting the aristocratic young
men of Athens to revolt against the democracy of
Athens, namely, against the rule of the majority. This
RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 284-85.
See MOHAMMED S. WATTAD, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL LAW: THREE
TENETS ON AMERICAN & COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 124-125 (VDM Verlag 2007).
160
161
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is what captured Plato’s mind in offering The Republic,
the challenge of providing a true definition of justice,
a philosophy of just and good society; for him,
democracy is the rule of Law, namely, the rule of
Good and Justice . . . While formal democracy is the
rule of the majority, constitutional democracy
considers the voice of the majority as another factor
in determining what is fair and just, thus preventing
any likelihood of abuse of minority rights (those
whose interests are not protected by the majority).
Formal democracy acts in accordance with the rule of
the legislature, no matter how right, decent, just, and
fair the legislature might be; what the legislature says
the law is becomes binding law. Constitutional
democracy scrutinizes the legislature’s actions for
their compatibility with the fundamental principles of
fairness, reason, justice, and good. Finally, formal
democracy represents the rule of law, but
constitutional democracy is driven by the rule of
[L]aw. As Plato once argued against formal
democracy, those who belong to the majority are
concerned only with their own immediate pleasure
and gratification, and therefore a democracy that
relies on the rule of the majority cannot produce good
human beings.162
The rule of law is one of the fundamental principles of the legal
system making up its core substantive elements, shaping the content
and interpretation of the legal norm and sometimes even determining
its validity. These fundamental principles are superior to primary
legislation.163 This approach also expresses the perception that the
Constitution itself is not always supreme, and it is subject to these
fundamental principles.164 In this regard Justice Aharon Barak’s
words are apt:

Id. at 196-98.
See HCJ 1/65 Yardur v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee
for the Sixth Knesset 19(3) PD 365, 389 (1965).
164 See SHMUEL SAADIA & LIAV ORGAD, REFERENDUM 123 (2000).
162
163
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As a matter of jurisprudential principle, it is possible
that the Court in a democratic society could declare
the voidance of a law which is contrary to the basic
principles of the system; even if these basic principles
are not enshrined in a rigid constitution or an
entrenched Basic Law, there is nothing axiomatic
about the approach that a law is not voided because
of its content. The voidance of a law by the Court
because of its severe violation of basic principles does
not violate the principle of legislative sovereignty,
since sovereignty is always limited.165
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide on the legality
of laws. This is pursuant to its constitutional and supra-legal power
enshrined in Section 15(c) of Basic Law: the Judiciary, and, in
particular, following the judicial rulings in the Mizrahi Bank case,166 as
well to its earlier rulings.167 The process of examining the legality of
laws is essentially interpretative in nature, where the task of
interpretation is one of the main judiciary powers.168
The Supreme Court’s power to interpret statutes, Basic Laws,
regulations and other legal norms is undisputed. When the Supreme
Court interprets a statute in light of a Basic Law, and a conflict is
revealed between the Basic Law and the statute in question, that
contradiction in essence is the interpretation of the laws in
question.169
The ruling in the Mizrahi Bank case further strengthened the
Supreme Court’s status in relation to its power to examine, not only
HCJ 142/89 La’Or Movement – One Heart and One Spirit v. Central
Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 44(3) PD 529, 555 (1990).
166 See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Vill.
(1995).
167 Cf. RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 182; HCJ 246/81 Agudat
Derech Eretz, at para. 17; HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Speaker of the Knesset et al.,
33(3) PD 141 (1983); HCJ 142/89 La’Or Movement, at para. 529; HCJ 726/94 Clal
Ins. Company et al. v. Minister of Finance et al., 48(5) PD 441 (1994).
168 See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 151-63; EITAN INBAR,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS REFLECTED IN JUDICIAL RULINGS 84 (2001).
169
INBAR, supra note 149, at 89.
165
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the statutes’ legality, but also their constitutionality. The crux of this
latter power is the fulfillment of the Court’s role in maintaining the
rule of law.170 This is because the primary function of the Supreme
Court is to instil democratic values in society and enforce the rule of
law, particularly on the government authorities, where it is the
legitimacy of the Constitution and the Basic Laws which legitimizes
judicial review.
Moreover, in essence, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s
power to review the constitutionality of statutes is derived from the
constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in its substantive
sense; that is to say, in the sense of checks and balances.171 This is
true a fortiori in light of the fact that the Basic Laws, in particular after
the judicial decision in the Mizrahi Bank case, have attained supraconstitutional normative status. In that case, clear rules were laid
down that relate not only to the normative status of the Basic Laws,
but also to the normative mechanism involved in their operation,
including changes to and the infringement of rights protected under
them, as well as the examination of the nature of Basic Laws which
are formally entrenched and others which are substantively
entrenched.
Holding this position, I have no wish to ignore the rationale
underlying the approach taken by Justice Eliezer Rivlin towards
public trust: a rationale that emphasizes the status of the judiciary as
devoid of a wallet and a sword. Indeed, one could argue that the
judiciary might appropriately possess its own wallet and sword, but in
their absence, it would not be right to overturn that public trust.
However, public trust in the judiciary means:
Trust in judicial professionalism, judicial fairness and
judicial neutrality which is the public’s confidence in
the moral character of the judge. It is public trust that
judges are not parties to the legal struggle, and that it
is not for their power that they struggle, but for the
protection of the Constitution and its values . . .
RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 265-311.
See id. at 127-128; see also, e.g., HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction, at 158; HCJ
306/81 Platto-Sharon, at 158; HCJ 5364/94 Velner, at para. 788.
170
171
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Public trust means giving expression to history rather
than hysteria.172
VI. SO IT IS, AND NOTHING MORE!
In conclusion, given the ripeness doctrine, I wonder whether
the judgment rendered in the Mizrahi Bank case would have seen the
light of day had the case not come before the Court today. I fear not.
“Fear,” I write, because I regard the constitutional revolution brought
about by the Mizrahi Bank case as a blessing “fear,” I write, because I
consider the ripeness doctrine to pose a danger. Am I right? Only
time will tell. So, this fruit is left to ripen, and with time it will
become evident whether it is edible or not, which I hope it will not.
In the meantime, it is appropriate to note that a court which,
concurrent with its function of safeguarding justice, has to concern
itself with rebuffing political assaults and protecting its very existence
from attempts to weaken it – and the ripeness doctrine reflects such
an attempt – and may lose its equilibrium. At this time, the Supreme
Court has not yet lost its equilibrium, but there is no guarantee that
this risk will not materialize. At the end of the day, we are all
vulnerable human beings, flesh and blood, either we remain
“ordinary” people or we become worthy of being judges.

172
Barak, supra note 102, at 50-51; see also CrimFH 5567/00 Deri v. State of
Israel 54(3) PD 614, 601 (2000).
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